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Thispaperstudiesthe evolution ofincomeinequality incentral Spain during thelate seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, taking as case study the province of Guadalajara. The first part of the
paper presents the sources and the dataset that was created to estimate income inequality using
grain tithes. The second section shows that through the period grain representedthelion share of
total income and therefore that it can be used as a reliable proxy. The following part of the paper
introduces an analysis of income inequality in the province during the period 1690 1800 and
concludes that inequality decreased during the last third of the eighteenth century. Finally the
paperaddressesthisunexpectedresultandconcludesthatitwasconsequenceofthesuccessofthe
land reform carried out by the central government in the late 1760s. The reform was a success in
Guadalajara, thanks to the characteristics of its population and the lack of bargaining power of
pressure groups.














are several reasons that support the choice of Guadalajara as a case study. Like most of the regions in late 17th century Europe,
Guadalajara was a typical pre modern province characterised by an almost entire reliance on agriculture and small scale subsistence
production. Its study will allow us to obtain conclusions that could easily be extrapolated to other areas of the continent with similar
socioeconomic characteristics. Guadalajara is also an interesting case study given its close geographical proximity to Madrid. The
capital of Spain depended heavily on theimportsofgrainsfrom the surroundingregions, and Guadalajara witha surplus of grain was
one of the suppliers to the city.
1 The study of Guadalajara is therefore interesting from the point of view of economic geography, to
empirically examine what were the effects on inequality of a growth pole like Madrid on its surrounding areas.
A signiﬁcant part of the research is based on the creation of an extensive dataset with more than 112,000 observations.
Therefore the ﬁrst part of the paper will present the primary sources that are used in the study, examining their origins, reliability,
and the way they are used in our research. The second part of the paper will establish that grain production represented the lion
share of total incomes in our sample, and therefore that it is a reliable proxy to measure income inequality. The next section will
study the evolution of inequality during the period 1690 1800, to conclude that inequality between grain producers in
Guadalajara diminished during the last third of the eighteenth century. This ﬁnding contradicts the traditional literature on
Spanish economic history that considers the eighteenth century a period of increasing inequality. The following part of the paper
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13331-C02-01 and from the HI-POD Project, Seventh Research Framework Programme Contract no. 225342" is acknowledged.
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1 Our estimations show that in the early 1750s Guadalajara produced 750,435 fanegas of wheat and consumed 635,130, obtaining a surplus that could maintain
almost 20,000 inhabitants.
1will examine the dynamics of the decrease in inequality, showing that the reduction in the proportion of small peasants was the
key factor. The next section will look more in depth into the changes in inequality using a Theil index taking into account three
dimensions, the size of the municipality, the access to a major road and the amount of rural workers. Finally the paper will argue
that the most plausible explanation to this fall in inequality was an agrarian reform carried out by the Bourbon governments that
ordered the allocation of common lands owned by local councils between small producers. The intention of the government was
guaranteeing the supply of food in large urban areas like Madrid, encouraging the creation of a middle class of peasants. This new
social class would be wealthy enough to promote demographic growth and to constitute the economic foundations of the
kingdom. In that sense the reform worked in Guadalajara, where the number of producers increased, the amount of very small
producers was reduced, and population growth was sustained while it stagnated in the rest of the interior. We will conclude that
the most important reason for the success of the reform in the province was the equality that existed between grain producers of
Guadalajara. In line with Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), the lack of bargaining power from local oligarchies facilitated the
development of the reform, and made possible the success of an economically efﬁcient institutional framework.
1. Primary sources
From Old English teotha (tenth), the tithe represented a yearly tax that had to be paid by every producer to the ecclesiastical
authorities. The ﬁrst citations to the tithe can be found in the Old Testament, where according to the Genesis Abram paid the tithe
to Melchizedek, the King of Salem (Jerusalem) who also occupied the charge or priest of El Elyon (“the Most High God”) (Genesis
14:18). It was a common feature in the economic framework of the middle ages and of modern European countries. In Spain the
tithe survived until the Desamortizacion of Mendizabal, a process of conﬁscation of ecclesiastical properties led by the liberal
Spanish government in 1837. During the eighteenth century the tithe paid by producers in Guadalajara represented the usual 10%
of the harvest. The description of the tithes and the way the tax was deﬁned was perfectly explained in 18th century manuscripts.




those eleven nothing else will be paid. And if the production does not reach ten half fanegas then nothing will be paid at all from this
rightofprimicias,understandingthatthisrightisnotperformedinthecaseofoats,andthatitisarightthatispropertyofthepriestof
the parish of the mentioned village of Alboreca and as such he receives it.
2
The excellent quality of the tithes encouraged its use to analyse the evolution of agrarian production in Spain. The analysis of
tithe series facilitated the publication of a signiﬁcant number of regional studies in medieval and early modern times.
3 However
the sources used in these studies were usually obtained from the archives of the bishoprics, meaning that they are normally
aggregated yearly records for the whole dioceses or shires. The richness of the tazmia books used in this paper allows the
researcher a very detailed and unique analysis of the economic reality of grain producers in Spain. Although tazmia books have
been used in other regions to estimate the evolution of total production over time, this is the ﬁrst time that they are being used to
calculate the changes in income inequality and therefore open a very promising line of research.
The tazmia books contain the information about the tithes paid in every parish. They are a very rich source of information for
economic historians, and include detailed records about the amount of grain that was taxed by the church to every peasant in
every town and village every year. This level of detail is extremely rare for early modern times, as most of the records in countries
like England only kept the total amount of product taxed and not the distribution by producer. Every year after the harvest an
ofﬁcial collector examined the amount of grain produced by every peasant and determined the 10% that had to be paid as tax. The
collector was normally a neighbour of the village who therefore had local knowledge of the area he had to control. His salary was
based on the amount of grain taxed, a fact that acted as an incentive to minimise the principal agent problems between him and
the ecclesiastical authorities (Alvarez Vazquez, 1984 :76). The Sinodal Constitutions of 1606 demanded that the tithe had to be
paid from the total amount of grain produced, before extracting any sort of production costs or even the seeds required for the
following harvest (Melon Jimenez, 1987:181). The grain was normally examined by the collector in the same ﬁeld right after the
harvest, and it could not be touched or moved by the peasant until the amountto be paid was determined. The grain taxedin every
parish was usually kept in a speciﬁc building where the costs that included the salary of the collector were subtracted. The grain
that remained was then distributed between the local priest, the bishop, and also civil authorities. The major beneﬁciary was the
church, obtaining the shares for the local priest and the bishop, effectively taking the lion share of the amount collected.
When all the tithes had been determined the priest wrote the tazmia book, a document where year after year he registered the
names of all the producers and the amount taxed to each one. The original records for the year were given to the ofﬁcial collector,
and a copy was sent to the archives of the bishop. Finally the priest included another copy of the tithes paid which were added to
the books that he kept himself and that are now the manuscripts that we have used in our research. At the end of all the records in
2 Catastro de la Ensenada. Book of Alboreca, pp. 241–242.
3 For example they have been used to estimate the evolution of grain production in Valencia (Ardit Lucas, 1989; Palop Ramos, 1982), Malaga (Benitez Sanchez-
Blanco, 1982), Basque Country (Bilbao and Fernández de Pinedo, 1982), Galicia (Eiras Roel, 1982), Segovia (Garcia Sanz, 1982), Murcia (Lemeneunier, 1982),
Toledo (Lopez-Salazar Perez and Martin Galan, 1981), Andalucia (Ponsot, 1969), Leon (Sebastián Amarilla, 1992) or Mallorca (Vidal, 1978).
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2the book, the priest included a personal declaration stating that the details included were accurate and that all the producers had
been included. The local priest of the village of Angon wrote in 1760:
“I the licenciado Don Juan de Aleman local priest of the village of Angon certify that these tazmias are accurately executed
according to what has been declared by the producers, and having published them nothing can be found against them.”
4
The small average size of the villages in Guadalajara worked in favour of the ecclesiastical authorities and against the
possibilities of cheating. The supervision costs were lower than in other areas of Spain like the south where vast agro towns
dominated the landscape of the countryside. A good practice that was also imposed by the ecclesiastical authorities required that
the priest had to make public the records reading them in a speciﬁc mass with the names and the tax paid by every peasant. This
mechanism worked also as a defensive measure to prevent cheating, as any member of the community could easily make a
complaint about the amounts paid by one of their peers. In the ﬁnal declaration as showed in the case of Angon, the priest included
a note stating if there had been any complain against the records presented by any member of the community. We could not ﬁnd
any ﬁnal declaration with complaints in any year of our sample, a point that reinforces the reliability of the source.
Weincludedinourresearchthe22municipalitieswhoserecordsstillsurviveinthearchivefortheperiod1690 1800.
5Thedataset
obtained from the tazmia books includes more than 112,000 observations, extracted from the taxes paid by more than 14,000
producers duringthe seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies. To create thedataset we extracted the tithes paid by all the producers in
each oneof the municipalities in thesample. The paper beginsin 1690 asconsequence of the lackof data available forprevious years.
The last year of our sample was chosen for historical reasons that affected the reliability of the source. It is generally accepted that




Another key primary source that is used in the paper is the Catastro de la Ensenada, a survey ordered in 1749 that covers more
than 15,000townsandvillagesin the CrownofCastile. It wascreatedto gatherinformationfor theestablishmentof a newtaxation
system, and therefore includes information about goods, prices, production, wages, etc. The Catastro is therefore a monumental
work that includes extensive information about the Castilian society and economy. Every municipality had to answer to 40
questions giving information about its name, limits, houses, wealth, production,livestock, trade, manufactures as well as a long list
of socioeconomic variables. The following map presents the provinces where the survey took place.
Theprocess to answer the questionswas perfectly outlinedin the governmentalorder published the10th of October 1749. First the
majorofthevillagereceivedaletterfromtheprovincialauthoritiesnotingthedatewhentheroyalorderwouldarriveaswellastomake
public the information that was attached to it. Thesecond step wastheelection of a committee in the village thatwould be responsible
to answer the 40 questions. They were chosen by the local council and included two or more experts on the criteria demanded by the
order, like the different lands, products, population, etc. The third stage included the arrival of the external authority that had to carry
outthequestionnaire,withthehelpofalawyer,ascrivener,andtheexpertsthatwerenecessaryineverycase.Thenthelocalauthorities
with the committee chosen were called to an audience. The last step was the proper answer that the committee had to give to the




survey, we can obtain information about economic and social variables for every village in Castile. For instance, question number 14
asked about the amount of food produced both in quantity and value. The exact content of the question was:
“What is the normal value that every year the fruits have produced by the lands of the municipality, and what was their quality.”
The answers to the questions were literal, for example, the authorities from the village of Benquerencia de la Serena answered
the previous question by stating:
“every fanega of wheat that is harvested in the village considering some years with others is sold in sixteen reales, the one of rye
in eleven and the one of barley in eight …”
7
The prices and all of the quantitative information included in the Catastro was not just speciﬁc for the year when the answers
were given, but an average of several years that were normally the ﬁve previous to the interview. If that was not the case and the
4 Tazmia Book of Alboreca, 1760.
5 The series corresponds to the following municipalities and parishes: Alboreca/San Andres, Alcuneza/San Pedro, Alpedroches/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Angon/
Santa Catalina, Anquela del Pedregal/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Aragosa/Nuestra Señora de la Paz, Bañuelos/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Canales de Molina/San
Cristóbal, Cantalojas/San Julian, Castejon de Henares/San Miguel, Ciruelos del Pinar/Santa Magdalena, La Fuensaviñan/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Galve de Sorbe/
Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Herreria/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Hijes/Natividad, Ledanca/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Miedes de Atienza/Natividad, Mohares/San
Cristóbal, Riba de Saelices/Santa Maria Magdalena, Rillo de Gallo/Santo Domingo de Guzman, Santiuste/Transﬁguración, Sienes/Santa Eulalia, Torrubia/Asuncion de
Nuestra Señora, Trillo/Asuncion de Nuestra Señora, Valdelcubo/Santiago, Villares de Jadraque/Natividad and Villaseca de Henares/San Blas.
6 Garcia Sanz, A.”La produccion de cereales y leguminosas en Castilla la Vieja. Los diezmos del Obispado de Segovia de 1570 a 1800” in Ladurie, E.L.R., and Goy,
J., Tithe and agrarian history from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries: an essay in comparative history (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
7 Catastro de la Ensenada, book of Benquerencia de la Serena.
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3value given was the one for a single year, then the information could be affected by short term events and therefore would present
methodological problems. Another important aspect to highlight is that the Catastro was carried out over several years, and that if
the values given in the answers were the ones of a speciﬁc year, then the cross section comparisons could be misleading. Therefore
the nature of the answer allows us to avoid these problems and therefore improves the reliability of the source.
The dataset that we created from the Catastro includes variables like the size of the municipality, the number of peasants,
shepherds, workers, aristocrats, wages, taxes paid, production of grain and wool prices, etc. The Catastro is used in this paper to
estimate the percentage that grain production represented in total income and to study the socioeconomic characteristics of the
locations included in our sample.
The paper also includes original baptismal and burial series created for the province of Guadalajara that were extracted from
the historical archive of Siguenza Guadalajara.
8 The yearly baptismal and burial series were combined to estimate the evolution of
total population in Guadalajara, a variable that is used in the paper to estimate the evolution of labour force.
2. Using grain as a proxy of income
Grain production represented the bulk of the agrarian economy of Guadalajara, and we therefore believe that it is a good proxy
of income for the province. However, in order to calculate more accurately how representative grain production was, we used the
information provided in the Catastro de la Ensenada to estimate the percentage that grain production represented of total income.
The calculation was carried out for the sample of municipalities that are presented in this paper. To estimate agrarian production
we used the main tithe records, grains and also wool and lambs were included in the answers to question 16 of the Catastro.W e
also included all the minor tithes that were normally paid to the local priest and that contain a wide variety of products from
vegetables to chickens, pigs, and honey. To be sure that the estimation included the production that was not taxed with the tithe,
we usedthe answers toquestions10, 11 and12 in the Catastro. Question11 askedabout the differentproducts thatwere produced
in the village. We used that information to check what was produced and what did not appear in the information about tithes.
However, the question does not reveal the amount of each item that was actually being produced. We can nevertheless estimate
this amount indirectly through the information provided in questions 10 and 12 of the Catastro. Answer to question 10 explained
the different types of land including quality, the size of each plot and more importantly the products that were being cultivated on
each one. The answer to question 12 showed the productivity of each sort of land depending on what product was cultivated on
them. Therefore, combining the land that was being dedicated to each product and the productivity, we were able to estimate the
production that was not included in the tithes. Finally, the information to answer question 14 presented the average prices of the
products cultivated in the municipality that were used to transform the production from kind to cash.
To complete the estimation of income we also included information about wages. In every village there was normally a priest,
baker, etc. and their income should also be included in the calculations. The Catastro presents information about the wages and
incomes of that part of the population that was added to agrarian production. To complete the estimation we also included the
informationaboutparttimejobscarriedoutbypeasantswhiletheywerenotdirectlyengagedinagriculture.Someofthesalarieswere
paid in kind (normally wheat) and in those cases, as in agrarian production, salaries were transformed into cash to be aggregated.
Table 1 shows an example of how total incomes were calculated for each municipality. First of all we calculated the incomes
generated from the primary sector by estimating the production in kind and then in cash using the local prices paid by each item.
Secondly we estimated the incomes derived from the secondary and tertiary sectors by using the yearly wages estimated for every
worker in the municipality. We ﬁnally estimated the percentage of the total income that the production of grain represented.
We established that in the early 1750s grain production in our sample represented around 70% of total income. However we
believe that this number changed over time during the eighteenth century. Our estimations show that in the early 1750s, 72% of
the income in our sample came from grain production, 14% from wages and 14% from other agrarian production. Using this
information as starting point, we created several indexes to measure the evolution of output and labour during the eighteenth
century and then used them to re estimate the decadal distribution of income. To estimate the evolution of income derived from
grain production we used yearly grain tithe series for wheat, barley, rye and oats in Guadalajara that were transformed into cash
using grain price series. In the case of wages we estimated the changes in labour force by calculating the evolution of population.
From yearly baptismal and burial records from Guadalajara we created a population index as proxy of labour force. We then
combined the population index with an index of real wages for New Castile to obtain the evolution of total income derived from
salaries.
9 We do not count on yearly series of other primary products and therefore cannot control how it changed during the
century. However we decided to proxy it using grain production series assuming that the increases and decreases of production
were mainly based on changes in climatic conditions. Therefore we assume that the years of bad grain harvests were also years of
bad harvests in fruits, vegetables, etc. The products included in this calculation were mainly cultivated in the rich and fertile lands
8 Baptismal series include the following municipalities and parishes: Albares/San Esteban, Anchuela del Pedregal/San Andres, Anquela del Ducado/San Martin,
Arroyo/Inmaculada, Bañuelos/Asunción de Nuestra Señora, La Bodera/Santiago, Cantalojas/San Julian, Cañizares, Castilmimbre/Asunción de Nuestra Señora,
Ciruelos del Pinar/Santa Magdalena, La Cobeta/Asunción de Nuestra Señora, Concha/San Juan Bautista, Congostrina/Asunción de Nuestra Señora, Galve de Sorbe/
Asunción de Nuestra Señora, Garbajosa/San Miguel, Hijes/Natividad, Milmarcos/San Juan Bautista, Olmeda de Jadraque/San Mateo, Peralejos de las Truchas/San
Mateo, Renales/San Sebastián, Riba de Saelices/Santa Maria Magdalena, Setiles/Asunción de Nuestra Señora, Sienes/Santa Eulalia, Somolinos/Inmaculada and
Torrubia/Asunción de Nuestra Señora. Burial series were extracted from the municipalities of Cantalojas, Hijes, Galve de Sorbe, Bañuelos, Somolinos, Milmarcos,
Valdelcubo, Torrubia, Adobes and Azañon.
9 The real wages index was extracted from (Llopis Agelan and García Montero, 2009).
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4next to the riverbanks that were the ﬁrst ones to be fully exploited. We therefore do not expect signiﬁcant changes in the area
cultivated, and consequently changes in total output derived from the use of more land are improbable. The decision seems to be
correct also in the case of livestock that depended on the availability of grain, especially rye and oats that were essential to feed the
animals. We transformed the production index into cash by using a price index of primary products where we did not include the
prices of the four grains (Fig. 1).
The results shown in Fig. 2 indicate that in the early eighteenth century grain production represented 70% of total income, a
ﬁgure that remained stable during the ﬁrst half of the century with the exception of 1720 when the ﬁgure decreased to 64%. The
situation changed during the second half of the century when the percentage rose graduallyto reach 84% in 1800. This process was
mainlyconsequence of theinﬂation in grainprices thatincreasedmorerapidly thanprices fromotherproductswhile real wagesin
New Castile declined rapidly. By 1800 real wages in New Castile had been reduced to half the levels reached in 1750. Therefore we
believe that the use of grain production as an estimator of incomes was good during the whole century, improving over time and
reaching its maximum reliability during the last decades.
3. Gini coefﬁcient
The Gini Coefﬁcient measures the dispersion of the observations in a sample and has been widely used to measure inequality.
The coefﬁcient takes values between 0 and 1 attributing a value of 0 to perfect equality and a value of 1 to perfect inequality. In other
words and in the case that we are studying, the Gini Coefﬁcient would be 0 if all the peasants produce exactly the same amount of




Xk−Xk 1 ðÞ Yk + Yk 1 ðÞ ð1Þ
Fig. 1. Guadalajara within the Crown of Castile.
Table 1
Calculation of total income in the village of Bañuelos, early 1750s (in reales).
Amount of land Output per unit of land Total output Price per unit produced (reales) Value
Vegetables 10 25.0 250 3.0 75
Hemp 10 283.0 2830 0.2 51
Hemp Seed 10 1.5 15 2.0 30
Fruit 3 10.0 30 5.0 15
Wheat 4780 15.0 71,700
Barley 2260 7.5 16,950
Oats 120 7.5 900
Lambs 460 8.0 3680
Wool 1970 1.0 1970
Total Primary Sector 96,000
Wages 20,665
Total Income 116,665
% Grains (Wheat, Barley, Rye and Oats) 76.8%
Source: Catastro de la Ensenada. Book of Bañuelos.
87 C. Santiago-Caballero / Explorations in Economic History 48 (2011) 83–96
5Where G is the Gini coefﬁcient, X is the cumulated proportion of the population variable and Y is the cumulated proportion of
the production of cereals. Using the information provided by the Tazmias books from around 15,000 producers and following the
methodology presented above, we generated decadal calculations of the Gini coefﬁcient for cereal production in Guadalajara. We
used bootstrap methods in order to estimate standard errors and to construct conﬁdence intervalsthat would revealif the changes
detected are statistically signiﬁcant.
10
The results showed in Fig. 3 reveal four long term trends during the period. The ﬁrst one shows an increase in inequality
levels from 1690 until 1710. The second period shows convergence and inequality reduction from 1710 until 1740. The third
one shows an increase of inequality starting around 1750 and ending around 1770. The last period shows again convergence
between producers that took place from 1770 until the end of the century. The long term trend shows a period of
convergence between small and big producers, when inequality in cereal production was reduced. However the conﬁdence
intervals determine that the only change that was statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level was the decrease between 1770
and 1800. Other inequality proxies present a very similar behaviour. Fig. 4 shows that the results for the Theil index follow
the same trends previously shown in the Gini coefﬁcient. The share of output owned by the top 1% and bottom 10%
distributions showed in Figs. 5 and 6 also indicate the same evolution reinforcing the conclusions obtained from the Gini
coefﬁcient.
Thedecreasethattookplacebetween1770and1800wastheonlyonethatwasstatisticallysigniﬁcantatthe95%level.Butwhat
was the economic effect of the reduction in the Gini coefﬁcient from 0.51 to 0.47 that took place during the last third of the
eighteenth century? Was it consequence of small producers catching up? We can provide some answer to these questions. In our
sample,doublingtheproductionofthebottom12%wouldreducetheGinicoefﬁcientby0.1points.Toreduceitby0.4points,thatis
the reduction that took place during the late eighteenth century we would have to double the production of the bottom 33% of the
distribution. These are therefore not small changes, and the economic effects especially in the situation of the bottom part of the
distribution could be important.
To better understand what was driving inequality changes we divided all producers at each turning point into 10 equal
sized groups depending on their production levels using deciles. The ﬁrst group therefore includes the number of peasants
whose production levels were between 0 and 9.9% of the output of the biggest producer, the second one 10 19.9, etc. Fig. 7












1690 1700 1710 1720 1730 1740 1750 1760 1770 1780 1790 1800
Grain Wages Other
Fig. 2. Share of total income in Guadalajara, 1690–1800.
Fig. 3. Decadal Gini coefﬁcient in Guadalajara, 1700–1800. The dashesd line represents the conﬁdence intervals at a 95 per cent level.
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.
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6shows that between 1770 and 1800 the biggest change took place in the ﬁrst decile, which decreased by 8%. Most of these
small producers jumped into the second decile, while the third, fourth, ﬁfth and sixth also show increases although less
signiﬁcant.
Fig. 8 shows a more detailed analysis of the movements which took place within the ﬁrst decile. The results reveal that it
was within the ﬁrst two percentiles where the largest decrease took place, followed by the 3 5p e r c e n t i l e s .W ec a n
therefore conﬁrm that the decrease in income inequality was mainly a consequence of very small producers improving
their positions.
4. The internal dynamics of inequality changes (Theil)
Although the Gini coefﬁcient is a good way of measuring the changes in total inequality, it also has limitations. A different way
of measuring inequality levels is the use of generalized entropy measures like the Theil Index, a measurement that has also been
widely used in the literature of income inequality (Steckel and Moehling, 2001; Mora Sitja, 2006). Although the properties of the
Theil Index are very similar to those of the Gini coefﬁcient, it allows deeper analysis of the data and it can be easily decomposed. In
other words, if we divide our sample of producers in different groups by village, by production, etc. the Theil index will show us if
Fig. 4. Decadal Theil index in Guadalajara, 1700–1800. The dashesd line represents the conﬁdence intervals at a 95 per cent level.











































































Bottom 10% Top 1%
Fig. 5. Output share of the top 1% and bottom 10%, 1690–1800.






























Fig. 6. Gini coefﬁcient and ratio share top 1%/bottom 10%, 1690–1800.
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.
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7the changes in inequality identiﬁed are a consequence of changes of inequality within those groups or between them. Its














In our case, n would be the number of producers, wi the production of the individual i and μ the arithmetical average of the
sample. If we divide the observations of a sample in different groups, the Theil index can tell us what the changes in inequality
within and between each group are. In our case we decided to divide the producers in the sample by villages grouping them by
size. Therefore, three groups were created with small, medium and big villages. There are good reasons to support this division, as
the size of the village also deﬁned its economic and social structure. Small villages were mainly occupied by a homogenous group
of small peasants that were owners, while big villages included also manufactures producers and workers that did not own land.
We can therefore expect differences in inequality between the three groups that can be explored by the Theil index. Following the
methodology presented above, for every group g, μg is the average production, ng the number of producers and Tg is the Theil






























The ﬁrst term in (3) corresponds to the weighted addition of the Theil indexes of every group and therefore presents inequality
within each group; in other words, it measures inequality within small, medium and big villages. The second term shows
inequality between the three groups.
Finally,theTheilindexcanbealsodecomposedintothreeelements;changesintheproportionofthepopulationofthegroups(4),
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Fig. 7. Changes in the distribution of the production, 1770/1800.








Fig. 8. Changes in the distribution within the ﬁrst decile, 1770/1800.
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.





































































Table 2 shows that during the period 1770 1800 the reduction of inequality was mainly driven by group convergence,
especially in medium and big villages. On the other hand, there was a small increase in the inequality within small villages. The
reason was that in small villages inequality levels were already low in 1770, while high inequality levels in medium and big
villages were reduced during the following three decades. Overall the eighteenth century was a period of convergence in the three
groups of villages, although bigger villages reduced inequality levels at a more intense rate(where the Theil Index fell by 5 points).
On the other hand, the decline of inequality in small and medium villages was more moderate with a reduction of 1 point. Most of
the reduction in big villages took place during the late eighteenth century when the Theil index in the group fell by 10 points. The
study of the Gini coefﬁcient shows very similar results with a fall of 1 point in medium villages between 1710 and 1800, 2 points in
small ones and again a considerable decrease in big villages where the Gini coefﬁcient fell by 3 points during the same period.
The existence of rural workers also played a role in the different evolution of inequality changes. We divided our sample
depending on the percentage of rural workers that lived in each municipality. The ﬁrst group included all locations where there
were no rural workers, the second group comprised of the municipalities where rural workers existed. Table 3 shows that most of
the change took place within groups, and that inequality decreased in both. However the decline was more intense in the
municipalities where there were no rural workers, more than doubling the decrease that took place in the locations where there
was a presence of workers.
We also studied the effect that roads had in inequality changes, dividing our sample between the municipalities that had a
direct access to a major road and those that did not. Table 4 shows that after 1770 inequality fell more in the locations that were
not connected to the mainnationalroads thatcrossed theprovince.A possible answerto this resultrelies on the average sizeof the
municipalities, smaller on average in the municipalities connected to a major road than the size of the locations that were not
connected.
In summary, inequality between grain producers in Guadalajara fell during the eighteenth century, mainly thanks to the
decline that took place from 1770. The process was characterised by a reduction in the proportion of very small producers that
became medium producers and that was especially intense in medium and big villages. The absence of rural workers also
facilitated the reduction in inequality. Finally inequalitydecreased more in those locations that were not connected to a main road.
But how was this possible? The eighteenth century is considered by the literature a period of increasing inequality when the
differencesbetween rich and poor increased. What wasdifferent in Guadalajaraand what was thetrigger behind the changes?The
answer can be found in the land reforms that were carried out by the central governments during the late 1760s.
5. The success of institutional change
The last third of the eighteenth century in Spain was a period dominated by the introduction of agrarian reforms. One of the most
importantgoalsofthegovernmentwasthecreationofapoolofmediumproducersthatwouldbecometheﬁscalcoreofthecountry.In
order to increase the protection of land tenants, new legislation was introduced by the government in 1763. The main purpose of the
reform was to imitate the English model increasing the security of the tenant in the long run. In 1785 the government regulated the
requirements necessary for a landowner to terminate the contract with his tenant, with the idea of avoiding random unjustiﬁed
expulsions.
11
11 González Enciso (1992:237).
Table 2
Inequality changes decomposed by size of village.
1770–1800




Inequality between groups 7%
Total inequality 100%
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.
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9Priceinstabilityandthecapacitytoguaranteethesupplyoffoodwerealsoissuesintheagendaoftheauthorities.Thepriceofgrain
inSpainincreasedsubstantiallyduringthe1750s,asituationthatthegovernmentattributedtothelackofinternaltrade.Toincentivise
thecommercialisation ofgrain,on July11,1765thegovernmentliberalisedgrain tradefreeingpriceswhichhadbeencontrolleduntil
thatpoint. The newlawalsoallowedtheresellingof grain whichhad beenforbidden until then.The importance of internaltrade was
highlighted bycontemporary politicians like Jovellanos, whowrotethat it would beneﬁt regionswith a surplus of grain.Accordingto
Jovellanos, with the new revenues those regions could serve as market for national manufactures (Jovellanos, 1744 1788).
12 The
growthofpricesencouragedtheincreaseofgrain production duringthe1750s,mainlyasaconsequenceofanincreaseinthenumber
of producers. This situation was probably the cause of an increase in inequality between grain producers in Guadalajara during the
period 1740 1770, when we observe that the number and proportion of very small producers increased. This created a problem for
many of these very small producers that in years of bad harvests they had to rely on the market to command enough food (Llopis,
2002:142).
In 1766 the rise of the price of bread in Madrid acted as a catalyst for the Esquilache riot that forced Carlos III to ﬂee Madrid. The








the most beneﬁted by the reform. In exchange for the land, the peasant had to pay a rent based on the harvest and had to exploit the
plot directly. The fact that such tight conditions were imposed explains why the reform failed in those areas where the proportion of
poor rural workers was high. In certain parts of Spain the power of local oligarchies tried to sabotage the reform and in many cases
succeeded. This was once more particularly important in areas where the amount of rural workers was high, and the power of big
landowners more prevalent.
In the Castilian province of Segovia the land reform failed because of the lack of physical capital in the hands of rural workers,
who did not own the tools which were a prerequisite to have access to the distribution of land (Garcia Sanz, 1984:258). The other
factor that limited the success of the reform in Segovia was the ability of the privileged classes to manipulate the distribution of
common land. Pressure groups of big landowners in Segovia controlled the sexmos, the institution responsible for redistributing
commonlandsthatimposedrestrictionstoruralworkersandsmallpeasants.Ina similar case,SanchezSalazarargued thatin areas
of southern Spain the land reform failed as consequence of the same reasons, lack of physical capital from the rural workers and a
strong inﬂuence of big landowners (Sanchez Salazar, 1984:266). While the legal framework kept rural workers out of the
redistribution, the economic elites also found legal ways to weaken the rights of the small peasant. For instance the authorities
12 Jovellanos addressed several economic issues in his Informe Sobre la Ley Agraria (Report on the Agrarian Law) where he also pointed out to the importance of
increasing competition in the grain market.
13 González Enciso (1992:237).
14 The rules that regulated access to common lands were published in the Real Providencia of May 23 and 24, 1770. Artola (1982:143).
Table 4
Inequality changes decomposed by proximity to road.
1770–1800
Inequality within groups 86%
Road 16%
No Road 70%
Inequality between groups 14%
Total inequality 100%
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.
Table 3
Inequality changes decomposed by number of rural workers.
1770–1800
Inequality within groups 93%
Rural workers 28%
No rural workers 65%
Inequality between groups 7%
Total inequality 100%
Sources: Same as Footnote 5.
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10could offer them parcels of low quality or at large distances from the village, increasing production costs to levels that forced them
to reject the proposal.
However there were cases where the reform was successful. In the province of Malaga the most privileged classes were
traditionally engaged not in agriculture, but in commercial and industrial activities (Fernandez Paradas,2001). This lack of interest
in the rural sector reduced the pressure on the local governments that allocated common lands more equally. The consequence
according to Fernandez Paradas was that in Malaga “the redistribution [of land] allowed the creation of a numerous group of small
tenants”.
Success was also the case of Guadalajara, where the extremely low level of rural workers reﬂected a society where the
bargaining power of big landowners was limited. The consequences of the reform in Guadalajara were important and from 1770
until 1800 the number of grain producers increased by 24%.
15 However, not only the number of producers grew, as explained
above, the levels of inequality between grain producers diminished showing that the reform improved indeed the access of small
producers to land.
The results from the analysis of the Theil index in several dimensions reinforce the hypothesis of the land reform as cause.
First of all the reduction in inequality levels took place mainly in medium and big villages. According to our calculations before
the reform common lands that could be potentially arable represented in small villages 15% of the total, while in villages of
bigger size the proportion increased to 40%. The average coincides with Garcia Sanz's estimations who argued that in 1750,
between 20 and 30% of the land in Spain was controlled by local councils.
16 Therefore when the reform took place more land
was distributed in medium and larger villages, allowing an intense decrease in inequality between producers in these
municipalities. Transports however played a minor role in the reduction of inequality that fell more in the municipalities that
were not connected to a major road. Those municipalities that were not connected to a road were on average larger, a situation
that could explain why inequality fell more in them. As explained above the percentage of common lands was higher in larger
municipalities, and it was in these areas where inequality fell more intensively than in smaller locations. The number of grain
producers grew more in the locations that were not connected to the road, showing that indeed the larger size and more
availability of common lands was the force behind this situation. Finally as explained before, the existence of rural workers was
a signiﬁcant factor to explain the failure of the reform in other parts of Spain. The major decrease in inequality in our sample
took place in those locations that did not have rural workers, indicating again that the agrarian reform was probably the most
important cause behind the decrease in inequality.
Therefore, the agrarian reform that failed in other parts of Spain was a success in Guadalajara, where the ideals of the
enlightenedgovernmentof creating aclassof medium producersthatwould encouragedemographicgrowthworked.In thissense
theuniquecharacteristicsofGuadalajarawerefundamentaltoexplainthesuccessofthereform.Guadalajarawasaprovincewhere
land was clearly the most abundant factor. In the early 1750s the population density was 18.6 inhabitants per square kilometre in
Spain, 17.2 in Castile, and 9.7 in Guadalajara.
17 Table 5 shows that the socioeconomic conditions of the inhabitants in Guadalajara
were also relatively good with low levels of rural workers and beggars. Therefore before the reform Guadalajara had plenty of land
to redistribute and a population with enough resources to fulﬁl the legal requirements to access it.
The relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of a society and the success of its institutions has been extensively
studied in the literature. Engerman and Sokoloff showed that the egalitarian societies of small grain producers in North America
werethekey forthedevelopmentof anefﬁcient institutional framework. Ontheotherhand,theunequalsocieties of theCaribbean
encouraged the creation of more dictatorial regimes that conduced to economic underdevelopment. The existence of social elites
that controlled the institutions and modelled them to favour their interests was the key, for the authors, to explain the lack of
economic performance in the economies of Central and South America (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). Applying the same idea to
eighteenth century Spain it is not strange that some authors argued that inequality increased. In the southern half of the country
15 Own estimations from tithe books.
16 García Sanz (1980).
17 Own calculations from Fernandez de Pinedo et al. (1980:18)and Lacomba (1999:321).
Table 5
Population density, rural workers and poor people early 1750s.
Density Workers/1000 Beggars/1000
North 34.1 5 9
South 18.8 186 22
Centre-North 14.8 66 25
Centre-South 11.1 149 36
Guadalajara 9.7 9 12
Source: See Appendix.
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11the power of big landowners was strong and therefore the privatisation of common lands probably reinforced their privileged
positions. However, Guadalajara included the best of the two agricultural systems of Spain; the low demographic pressure of the
south and the lack of rural workers of the north. Both factors combined explain why the redistribution of common lands in
Guadalajara worked better than in the rest of the country. Therefore, following Engerman and Sokoloff's ideas, the lack of powerful
pressure groups worked in favour of the agrarian reform.
6. Conclusions
The use of information from grain tithes seems to be a reliable source to estimate the evolution of income in Guadalajara. The
use of the source shows that the period 1770 1800 in the province is an age of decreasing inequality, when not only the number of
grain producers increased, but also when the differences between them diminished. Taking the period 1690 1800 as benchmark
we observe that against what is suggested by the literature in the case of Spain, the eighteenth century was a period when
inequality was reduced in Guadalajara. The study of the Gini Coefﬁcient and the distribution of grain producers, indicate that this
convergence was characterised by a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of very small and small producers. Small villages enjoyed
low levels of income inequality during most of the century and therefore there was almost no room to catch up. However, in larger
municipalities inequality levels were higher and there was still room to reduce the gap between big and small producers. A
detailed analysis of changes in inequality shows that this was the case and that most of the reductions of income inequality were
based on catching up of small producers in big villages. In a similar way the municipalities that did not have rural workers
beneﬁted from a larger decrease in inequality levels. On the other hand access to the major road network in Spain was not a
signiﬁcant force in the reduction of inequality. The second ﬁnding explains how the unexpected decrease in inequality took place.
Small peasants were able to increase the size of their exploitations by having access to the privatisation of common lands
promoted by the central government. Unlike the period 1740 1770, the availability of the new lands (normally pastures) made
possible the absorption of new producers in better conditions. The redistribution of common lands allowed many small peasants
toproduceabovesubsistencelevel andtherefore totake advantage oftradeandhigh grainprices. Theproportionof commonlands
was higher in larger villages, a situation that explains why the reduction in inequality was more intense in these sort of
municipalities. The reform that failed in other parts of Spain was successful in Guadalajara thanks to the lack of bargaining power
of pressure groups, a result of the unique characteristics of the population in Guadalajara. These characteristics combined the best
features of the two models of agricultural production in Spain; the high proportion of producers (and lack of rural workers) of the
north and the low pressure on natural resources of the south. Therefore, there was land to share and peasants able to fulﬁl the
conditions imposed by the government to access it. In addition, the similar characteristics that existed between grain producers in
Guadalajara reinforced the process. In other words and following Engerman and Sokoloff's arguments, the existence of an
egalitarian society made possible the adoption of an economically successful reform.
Appendix A. Description of sources
This section explains in detail the primary and some secondary, as well as the methodology to transform them in the variables
used in the paper that have not been described in the text.
The total production of wheat in Guadalajara was extracted from the manuscripts in the Catastro de la Ensenada. Question 15
asked about the taxesthat existed in each municipality. We took the information relatedto theecclesiastical tithe that represented
a 10% of the total harvest. We gathered the information for all the municipalities of Guadalajara, and by using this data we
estimated total production of wheat. We also estimated the population of Guadalajara gathering the answers to question 21
multiplying the number of vecinos (households) by 3.92, following the methodology in Censo de población de la Corona de Castilla
"Marqués de la Ensenada.
18 Then assuming a yearly consumption of 6 fanegas per inhabitant (Simpson, 1989) we estimated the
surplus of wheat in the region.
The calculations of inequality were based on the analysis of the production of wheat, barley, rye and oats from around 15,000
producers which is contained in the tithe (tazmias) books. The grains were weighted depending on the prices of each one. These
books were consulted in the Historical Diocesan Archive of Sigüenza Guadalajara. The sample of municipalities are described in
the text.
The information presented in Table 5 has been extracted from several sources. Population density was calculated from Censo de
población de la Corona de Castilla "Marqués de la Ensenada.
19 The number of rural workers and poor people were extracted directly
from the manuscripts in the Catastro de la Ensenada, and more exactly from questions 35 and 36. The population of the
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12Appendix B. Geography of central Spain
We aggregated data using the current geographical boundaries that are displayed in the following maps.
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